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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that an American company enters into a contract with a
subsidiary of a foreign country. The deal falls apart after the contract is
nearly complete. According to the investment contract, all contractual
disputes must be resolved through arbitration in the foreign country. The
American company initiates arbitration, but then the foreign government
adopts a series of substantive and procedural measures intended to harm the
American company’s interests. Though the international arbitration panel
proceeds to find in favor of the American company, the foreign country’s
courts later annul the favorable award. Under such circumstances, can the
American company nonetheless enforce the favorable award in the United
States or in another foreign country? Does this answer accord with
international arbitration practice?
Such a scenario recently confronted the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V.
(COMMISA) v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción (PEP).1 There, the Second
Circuit upheld the Southern District of New York’s enforcement of an
arbitration award annulled in Mexico, the forum state.2 This brought at least a
temporary end to the thirteen-year dispute between COMMISA and PEP.3
The Second Circuit concluded that the district court’s holding was in line with
the Panama and New York Conventions, despite the rarity of such a ruling.4
The court declined to defer to the Mexican court in the interest of international
comity,5 holding that the Mexican court’s decision to annul the award went
against the U.S. policy of allowing recourse for contractual violations, and
procedural technicalities made it nearly impossible for COMMISA to bring
suit against PEP in any other forum.6 The court reasoned that the enforcement

1
See Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. PemexExploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter COMMISA v. PEP].
2
Id.
3
As of April 2017, this dispute has officially ended. In January 2017, PEP filed a petition
for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. While this petition was being considered, the
parties settled, with PEP paying KBR, COMMISA’s parent company, $435 million. See
Chuck Stanley, Mexican Oil Co. Settles $435M Dispute With KBR, LAW360 (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/911580/mexican-oil-co-settles-435m-dispute-with-kbr.
4
COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 111.
5
International Comity is “[t]he principle that one sovereign nation voluntarily adopts or
enforces the laws of another sovereign nation out of deference, mutuality, [or] respect.”
Comity of Nations, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comity_of
_nations (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
6
COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 108–10.
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of this annulled award was justified to “vindicate ‘fundamental notions of what
is decent and just’ in the United States.”7
While the Panama and New York Conventions do grant courts
considerable discretion in the enforcement of arbitration awards, this ruling
marked the first time that a court enforced an annulled arbitration award
explicitly on the basis of U.S. judicial and public policy.8 This decision
changed the judicial landscape of enforcing arbitral awards in the United
States and furthered a discussion around the enforceability of awards
annulled in their arbitral forum. This Note provides a way to categorize
different approaches to interpreting decisions regarding the enforcement of
annulled awards and argues that U.S. courts implement U.S. judicial values
to determine whether to enforce annulled awards.
Part II of the Note will give a brief overview of the Second Circuit’s
decision in COMMISA v. PEP before explaining the reasons parties select
arbitration to adjudicate disputes and the overall purposes and benefits of
selecting arbitration, rather than judicial litigation to resolve disputes. It will
then discuss the prevalence of arbitration clauses in certain contracts,
particularly in procurement contracts. This section then explains the
importance of the Second Circuit’s decision, particularly as it relates to
understanding the reasons why parties select arbitration to resolve their
disputes, and the usual deference to international comity when courts are
faced with a decision to enforce awards arbitrated in a different forum. Part
II will conclude by discussing the reason why COMMISA v. PEP was a
landmark decision, and how this case differed from the only other decision in
which a U.S. court upheld a lower court’s enforcement of an award annulled
in the arbitral forum.
Part III will discuss the ability of states to enforce, or decline to enforce,
arbitral decisions awarded or annulled in a different forum state under the
New York and Panama Conventions. This section will also address the
Federal Arbitration Act, which affords U.S. courts the ability to implement
provisions of these Conventions. It will then discuss the history of
COMMISA v. PEP and the application of these Conventions by the Southern
District of New York and the Second Circuit to enforce an annulled award.
7

See id. at 107 (stating that “although the Panama Convention affords discretion in
enforcing a foreign arbitral award that has been annulled in the awarding jurisdiction, and
thereby advances the Convention’s pro-enforcement aim, the exercise of that discretion here is
appropriate only to vindicate ‘fundamental notions of what is decent and just’ in the United
States.” (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986))).
8
See generally In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F.
Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). Chromalloy marked the first time that the United States enforced
an annulled award, but there, the court’s decision was based on a policy in favor of binding
arbitration, rather than the policy concerns outlined in COMMISA v. PEP.
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This part will include an analysis of the United States’ Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia’s decision in In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the
Arab Republic of Egypt to understand the first time that an annulled award was
enforced in a U.S. court—twenty years before COMMISA v. PEP was decided.
An overview of Chromalloy will provide an explanation of one of the three
approaches that U.S. courts have taken in deciding whether to enforce annulled
awards. After a discussion of the “broad enforcement authority” approach in
Chromalloy, the “no enforcement authority” approach from Baker Marine9
and Spier10 will be analyzed before finally analyzing the “limited enforcement
authority” approach under TermoRio.11
Each of these enforcement
approaches, or rather lack of enforcement in many cases, has revolved around
an interpretation of the authority courts have under the New York or Panama
Conventions, as well as a discussion of applicable U.S. judicial policy.
Part IV will then discuss how other states have interpreted the
enforcement authority granted under the New York Convention. Based on
the same three categories outlined above, this section will focus on “broad
enforcement authority” in France, a “limited enforcement authority”
followed by Dutch courts, and the “no enforcement authority” reasoning of
British and German courts. This part will also provide a commentary on the
debate between Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg regarding the
scope of the New York Convention and whether states may enforce awards
that have been annulled in the seat of arbitration.
Finally, this Note will discuss states’ underlying protectionist reasons for
enforcing annulled awards. This Note will argue that courts that choose to
enforce or not to enforce annulled awards do so to protect their judicial
values. This was the circumstance in COMMISA v. PEP, where the Second
Circuit’s decision and interpretation of the New York and Panama
Conventions was a way to protect American judicial values in response to
the Mexican government’s protectionist measures. This section will analyze
the Second Circuit’s deference to judicial principles of equity, res judicata,
and the importance of providing parties with a forum in which to have their
disputes heard. Finally, this part will examine contractual principles
governing expectations at the time of contracting and risk allocation. While
it would seem that the Second Circuit’s decision to enforce the annulled
award was a way to protect an American company against an unfair
retroactive application of a law that benefitted a subsidiary of a foreign
government, by analyzing other states’ rationales for enforcing annulled

9
10
11

Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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awards, it appears that this was actually a way to protect judicial values
rather than to protect a particular company. Ultimately, Western judicial
systems, particularly the U.S. judicial system, take pride in upholding core
judicial values of fairness and party autonomy.
II. BACKGROUND
The invocation of what commentators have called the “judgment
recognition framework,” rather than an “arbitration policy framework,” has
raised debate over the inquiry to be applied to determine whether to enforce
annulled arbitration awards.12 A judgment recognition framework analyzes
whether the judgment rendered in the forum state is valid. An arbitration
policy framework analyzes whether the arbitral decision frustrated the
purposes of arbitration. Arbitration is intended to be a method of
“expeditious resolution of disputes” that avoids “protracted and expensive
litigation.”13 Yet, the controversy surrounding the COMMISA decision led to
a protracted and incredibly expensive dispute that will inevitably impact
future commercial arbitral disputes.
A. Selecting Arbitration
Arbitration clauses are particularly prevalent in commercial and
procurement contracts because they afford parties the ability to control key
factors should a dispute arise in the course of a contract.14 Moreover,
arbitration allows parties the opportunity to select arbitrators with knowledge
of different legal systems in cross-border disputes to ensure decisions are
reached in a fair manner.15 Ultimately, “businesses perceive international
arbitration as providing a neutral, speedy and expert [adjudicated] dispute
resolution process, largely subject to the parties’ control, in a single,
centralized forum, with internationally-enforceable dispute resolution
12

Donald Donovan et al., Client Update: U.S. Second Circuit Affirms Decision Enforcing
Annulled Arbitral Award, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.debevoise.
com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/08/20160812_us%20_second_circuit_affirms_d
ecision_enforcing_annulled_arbitral_award.pdf.
13
See Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1998).
14
The arbitral process affords parties the opportunity to contractually design the dispute
resolution process, including the length of testimony, the location of decision making, the
applicable laws, and the parties who will adjudicate the hearing. Furthermore, the process is
much more flexible, confidential, and permanent than traditional adjudication through national
courts. See Edna Sussman & John Wilkinson, Benefits of Arbitration for Commercial Disputes,
AM. B. ASS’N (Mar. 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/dispute_r
esolution_magazine/March_2012_Sussman_Wilkinson_March_5.authcheckdam.pdf.
15
Id.
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agreements and decisions.”16 Arbitration allows for commercial investments
and international development to be protected when foreign parties contract
for various services.
Traditionally, U.S. courts have adopted a judgment recognition
framework, rather than an arbitration policy framework.17 American courts
have often relied on the principle of international comity to give deference to
awards made in foreign jurisdictions by foreign sovereigns.18 This
deferential treatment provides a way for American courts to avoid
interference with foreign relations by overturning a decision made by foreign
sovereigns. Yet, as will be later discussed, the New York and Panama
Conventions provide courts with the ability to negate a foreign decision
under certain circumstances.19 Largely as a result of international comity,
U.S. courts have generally declined to enforce awards annulled in the seat of
arbitration. The controversial outcome in COMMISA v. PEP is only the
second time that courts have decided to enforce an annulled award.
In Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, the D.C. District
Court enforced an arbitral award previously annulled at the seat of arbitration
in Egypt.20 In Chromalloy, the court looked to Article VII of the New York
Convention in deciding to enforce the award as to not violate U.S. public
policy.21 The court analyzed the text of Article VII, particularly its emphasis
on parties’ rights in the enforcing jurisdiction.22 Ultimately, the court held
that the United States’ policy of final and binding arbitration of commercial
16

GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 73 (2d ed. 2014) (citing
Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural Theories of Private Judging, 22 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 163 (2011)).
17
Donovan et al., supra note 12.
18
See Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 19, 19–38 (Summer 2008), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol71/iss3/2 (citing
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 762 (1972)). In this case, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged numerous doctrines that are
“judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and among the
respective branches of the Federal government.”
19
See Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. (5), Jan. 30,
1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Panama Convention]; Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. (6), June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
20
In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 908
(D.D.C. 1996).
21
Id. at 914. See New York Convention art. (7), June 10, 1958, 21 U.N.T.S. 2517 (“The
provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself
of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the
country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”).
22
In re Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 913–14.
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disputes is “unmistakable, and supported by treaty, by statute, and by case
law.”23 The court declined to extend the previously relied upon principle of
international comity to the arbitral tribunal, stating that “[n]o nation is under
an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are
fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum.”24 After the
court’s decision in Chromalloy, it appeared as though the U.S. arbitral
landscape would change, and, perhaps, the United States would enforce
annulled awards regardless of the principle of comity.25 Yet, until the U.S.
judicial system was faced with COMMISA v. PEP, the courts consistently
declined to differ from decisions rendered by foreign sovereigns.
B. Legal Principles: The Panama Convention, the New York Convention,
and the Federal Arbitration Act
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention)
were “intended to unify nations and forego regional standards for handling
arbitration disputes by adopting a standardized arbitration framework,
thereby doing away with national peculiarities concerning enforcement
requirements and procedures.”26 Regardless of which convention applies in
an arbitral proceeding, the outcome in the United States is the same.27
The Panama and New York Conventions give the member states
substantial discretion in enforcing awards, yet they “evince a ‘pro23
Id. at 913 (“The Federal Arbitration Act ‘and the implementation of the Convention in
the same year by amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act,’ demonstrate that there is an
‘emphatic federal policy in favor or arbitral dispute resolution’ . . . .”).
24
Id. (citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (emphasizing the protection
of the “rights of its own citizens” in reaching this decision).
25
See Client Alert Commentary, Second Circuit Affirmed Enforcement of ICC Arbitral
Award Annulled Abroad, LATHAM & WATKINS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtL
eadership/second-circuit-affirmed-enforcement-of-ICC-arbitral-award-annulled-abroad.
26
Danielle Dean & Chelsea Masters, “In the Canal Zone”: The Panama Convention and
Its Relevance in the United States Today, ARB. BRIEF 2, no. 1, 90–102 (2012) (citing Nigel
Blackaby et al., Overview of Regional Developments, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA 3 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002)).
27
Even if the outcome would appear to be different under the two Conventions, courts have
interpreted the Panama Convention as an extension of the New York Convention,
“particularly when analyzing disputes to compel arbitration, determine jurisdiction, and
disputes over enforcement of an arbitral award.” Dean & Masters, supra note 26. Regardless,
the Panama Convention applies when a majority of the party States “have ratified or acceded
to the Inter-American Convention and are member States of the Organization of American
States. . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 305 (1994).
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enforcement bias.’ ”28 Moreover, Article V of the New York Convention
states that a state “may”29 refuse to recognize annulled awards “suspended by
a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.”30
Article V provides that:
1.

2.

A court can refuse to enforce an award at the request of a
party, if the party gives proof that:
a. The parties were incapacitated, or the agreement is
invalid under the law where the award was made;
b. The party was not given proper notice of the
proceedings or notice to appoint an arbitrator;
c. The award is outside the scope of the arbitration;
d. The composition of the arbitral proceedings did not
accord with the parties’ agreement; or
e. The award is not binding on the parties, or has been
set aside or suspended in the arbitral forum.
Recognition can also be refused if:
a. The subject matter of the award cannot be decided
under the laws of that country; or
b. The recognition or enforcement would be contrary
to public policy in the country where enforcement is
sought.31

28
See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 105 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim
& Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1997)). Accord CHRISTIAN BÜHRINGUHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 59 (2d ed. 2006)
(discussing the New York Convention’s minimum standard for the enforcement of awards).
29
Mike McClure, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards That Have Been Set Aside at the Seat:
The Consistently Inconsistent Approach Across Europe, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (June
26, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2012/06/26/enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-thathave -been-set-aside-at-the-seat-the-consistently-inconsistent-approach-across-europe/ (“On a
plain reading of the language of the New York Convention, the word ‘may’ denotes an option
and, therefore, there should in theory be no bar to a state recognising [sic] and enforcing an
arbitral award if it has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration.”).
30
New York Convention art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
31
Id. The text states:
(1) Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
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In COMMISA v. PEP, the Southern District of New York also relied on
Article VI of the Convention, which states that:
[i]f an application for the setting aside . . . of the award has
been made to a competent authority referred to in Article
(V)(1)(e), the authority before which the award is sought to be
relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision
on the enforcement of the award, and may also, on the
application of the party claiming enforcement of the award,
order the other party to give suitable security.32
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) incorporates the Panama and New
York Conventions into U.S. law and allows the U.S. courts to enforce
international arbitral awards.33 The FAA allows awards to be vacated:

failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, that award was made.
(2) Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement
is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.
32
New York Convention art. (6), Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
33
See 9 U.S.C. § 301 (1990) (stating that the “Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration of January 30, 1975, shall be enforced in United States courts in
accordance with this chapter”). Accord BORN, supra note 16, at 709.
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1.

[W]here the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means;
2. [W]here there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them;
3. [W]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
or
4. [W]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired,
the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.34
“[T]he ultimate test of any arbitration proceeding is its ability to render an
award which, if necessary, will be recognized and enforced in relevant
national courts.”35
C. History of COMMISA v. PEP
In 1997, COMMISA, a Mexican subsidiary of the American contracting
conglomerate KBR, Inc., entered into a contract with PEP, an oil and gas
subsidiary of PEMEX, the “state oil and gas company,” to build oil platforms
in the Gulf of Mexico.36 The original contract contained an arbitration clause
requiring disputes related to the contract to be arbitrated in Mexico City in
accordance with International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) regulations.37
The contract also contained an “administrative rescission” provision giving
PEP the unilateral right to rescind the contract if COMMISA breached or
abandoned the work, as well as a requirement that COMMISA post
performance bonds.38
34

9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (originally codified 1947).
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY
MATERIALS 704 (2d ed. 2001).
36
COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2016).
37
Id. at 98.
38
Id.
35

AND
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In May 2003, the dispute between COMMISA and PEP began when
COMMISA disagreed with PEP’s decision to fully complete the platforms
before moving them into the Gulf.39 Unable to reach an agreement, the
parties decided to enter into a new contract, which contained the same
arbitration and administrative rescission provisions as the original contract.40
In March 2004, the dispute came to a head when PEP administratively
rescinded the contract, forcing COMMISA employees from the worksite.41
In December 2004, COMMISA filed a demand for arbitration with the
International Chamber of Commerce, per the terms of the contract.42 At the
same time, COMMISA filed an “amparo action”43 with the Mexican district
court, to challenge the constitutionality, appropriateness, and timeliness of
PEP’s invocation of administrative rescission.44 The Mexican district court
found for PEP in the amparo action, but arbitration had already begun in
May 2005, before the court reached a decision.45 In December 2007, two
developments in Mexican law led to COMMISA’s claim against PEP being
barred in Mexico: the forum for public contracts was changed to the Tax and
Administrative Courts, which no longer allowed arbitration of such contracts,
and the statute of limitations on such claims was decreased from ten years to
forty-five days.46 Another significant change in Mexican law occurred in
May 2009, when Section 98 of the Law of Public Works and Related
Services was enacted. Section 98 stated that disputes arising out of
administrative rescission and early termination of a contract were no longer
subject to arbitration.47
In December 2009, the arbitral tribunal issued its finding in favor of
COMMISA.48 The tribunal found that PEP had in fact breached the
contracts with COMMISA and awarded COMMISA approximately $300
million in damages.49 COMMISA sought to have the award confirmed in the
Southern District of New York in August 2010.50 PEP appealed.51
Simultaneously, PEP filed an amparo action that eventually made its way
39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
An amparo action is filed to remedy a lost constitutional guarantee.
44
COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 98.
45
Id. at 98–99. The arbitral panel would not reach a decision until December 2009.
46
Id. at 99.
47
Id. (stating that “administrative rescission, early termination of the contracts and such cases
as the Regulation of this Law may determine may not be subject to arbitration proceedings”).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
40
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into the Eleventh Collegiate Court of Mexico, which held that PEP’s
administrative rescission could not be arbitrated and consequently annulled
the award set forth by the arbitral tribunal as a result of Section 98.52 PEP
then sought to have the annulment considered in the appeal from the district
court’s confirmation.53 After considering whether Section 98 could be
applied retroactively, as well as the recourse COMMISA would have
available if the court followed the decision of the Eleventh Collegiate Court,
the Southern District of New York “decline[d] to defer to the Eleventh
Collegiate Court’s ruling,” because the annulment “violated basic notions of
justice in that it applied a law that was not in existence at the time the
parties’ contract was formed and left COMMISA without an apparent ability
to litigate its claims.”54
PEP appealed the award to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which
upheld the lower court’s finding.55 The Court interpreted the Panama
Convention to mean that “a district court must enforce an arbitral award
rendered abroad unless a litigant satisfies one of the seven enumerated
defenses; if one of the defenses is established, the district court may choose
to refuse recognition of the award.”56 In considering the public policy issues
surrounding the award, the Court stated that “[a] judgment is unenforceable
as against public policy to the extent that it is ‘repugnant to fundamental
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is
sought.’ ”57 This public policy exception seems to “accommodate” “two
competing (and equally important) principles: [i] ‘the goals of comity and res
judicata that underlie the doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, and [ii] ‘fairness to litigants.’ ”58 The court made four
considerations before affirming a landmark decision to enforce an annulled
award.59 The court considered: “(1) the vindication of contractual
undertakings and the waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of
retroactive legislation that disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need to
ensure legal claims find a forum; and (4) the prohibition against government
expropriation without compensation.”60
The court ultimately affirmed the award because the result of Mexico’s
changing laws violated the “domestic principles of claim preclusion” and
52
53
54
55
56
57
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60

Id.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 106.
Id. (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Id. (quoting Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 841).
Id. at 107.
Id.
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“[a]bsent confirmation of the award, COMMISA would lose the opportunity
to bring its claims because of the change in Mexican law subjecting
COMMISA’s claims to the forty-five-day statute of limitations in the Tax
and Administrative Court.”61 Furthermore, COMMISA’s claims would be
barred by res judicata, and PEP, “acting on behalf of the Mexican
government,” would unjustly benefit at COMMISA’s expense.62
III. APPROACHES U.S. COURTS HAVE TAKEN IN DECIDING WHETHER TO
ENFORCE ANNULLED AWARDS
A court’s ability to enforce or not enforce an award can provide a way for
courts to protect their judicial values regardless of a decision rendered in a
different jurisdiction. The Second Circuit’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP
employs one of the three approaches taken by U.S. courts in deciding
whether to enforce annulled awards. In Chromalloy, the D.C. District Court
recognized the broad authority to enforce awards under the New York
Convention.63 Conversely, in Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd v. Chevron (Nig.)
Ltd.64 and Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., Second Circuit courts held
that they had no authority to enforce awards annulled in foreign courts.65
Finally, in TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P. et al., the D.C. Circuit
recognized that there was limited authority to enforce such awards when
presented with evidence of “tainted” or unauthentic foreign proceedings—
this situation finally transpired in COMMISA v. PEP.66
A. Broad Enforcement Authority
In Chromalloy, the D.C. District Court disregarded the principle of
international comity and enforced the annulled award—the first time a U.S.
court made such a decision.67 Here the court faced an investor-state dispute
over a military procurement contract.68 Finding Egypt liable for cancellation
of the contract, the arbitral panel ordered Egypt to pay certain sums to the
corporation.69 After this award was decided, Egypt sought to have it
61

Id. at 110.
Id.
63
See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907,
909–10 (D.D.C. 1996).
64
Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
65
Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
66
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
67
See In re Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 908.
68
Id.
69
Id.
62
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nullified by an Egyptian court.70 The Egyptian court suspended and then
nullified the award.71 The U.S. court found the arbitral award to be valid and
affirmed it, despite Egypt’s objections based on the “requirement” of
international comity.72
The court first analyzed the requirements to enforce a foreign judgment in
light of the “U.S. public policy in favor of final and binding arbitration of
commercial disputes. . . .”73 Looking to the FAA74 and the New York
Convention, the court concluded that “[a] decision by [the] Court to
recognize the decision of the Egyptian court would violate [the] clear U.S.
public policy.”75 The court also analyzed the role of international comity and
the reach of that principle before finding that the U.S. was not required to
give res judicata effect to the Egyptian court’s decision.76 Chromalloy
presented U.S. courts with the first opportunity to discern the enforceability
of annulled awards.77 This decision allowed U.S. courts to weigh U.S. policy
and law more favorably than the law of the country of origin in assessing the
validity of an award.78 After Chromalloy, it was assumed that the U.S.
would provide a forum for the enforcement of annulled awards, but despite
numerous opportunities to do so, it took nearly two decades for a U.S. court
to be presented with a similar enough question to warrant the same outcome.
B. No Enforcement Authority
Surprisingly, despite the pro-enforcement air created by the D.C. District
Court’s decision in Chromalloy, “[this case] did not usher in an era of
enforcement of [set aside international] arbitral awards. . . .”79 Following
Chromalloy, the courts largely declined to enforce annulled awards. In
Baker Marine, a breach of contract between Baker Marine, Danos, and
Chevron involved an oil supply in Nigeria and led to arbitration per the terms

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id. at 913.
73
Id.
74
See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (originally codified in 1947) for circumstances in which it is
appropriate to deny the enforcement of an award.
75
In re Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 913.
76
Id. at 914.
77
Id. at 911.
78
Id. at 911–14 (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,
Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)).
79
Jared Hanson, Note, Setting Aside Public Policy: The ‘Pemex’ Decision and the Case for
Enforcing International Arbitral Awards Set Aside as Contrary to Public Policy, 45 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 825, 849 (2014).
71
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of the original contract.80 The arbitral panel awarded Baker Marine over $2
million from Danos and Chevron.81 Danos and Chevron both separately
appealed the award in Nigerian courts, while Baker Marine attempted to
enforce the award in the Northern District of New York.82 Unlike the D.C.
District Court in Chromalloy, the district court in Baker Marine refused to
enforce the award because doing so would violate principles of international
comity. 83 On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling.84
The court interpreted the FAA to “ensur[e] that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”85 Consequently, rather than
focusing on the rights Baker Marine would have under American law, the
court deferred to the contractual requirement of Nigeria as the arbitral forum
and Nigerian law as the choice of law.86
This scope of enforcement, or rather absence of a scope of enforcement,
parallels the Southern District of New York’s decision in Spier v.
Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A.87 In Spier, arbitration proceedings began in
accordance with the terms of a contract between an engineer and an Italian
corporation.88 Despite the arbitrators unanimously finding for the engineer,
the corporation sought to have the award overturned in an Italian court.89
The court relied on Article VI90 of the New York Convention to ultimately
hold that the award should first be validated by the Italian courts before
being considered in the United States.91 The court deferred to the rule of
comity, reasoning that because the Italian government is a competent
authority,
it [was] better to permit the validity of [the] Italian arbitral
award to be first tested under Italian law by Italian courts. That
is preferable to an American court seeking to apply the law of
the foreign country where the award was made, and entering an

80

Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 195 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 196.
82
Id.
83
Id. (stating that under the New York Convention, FAA, and principles of comity “it
would not be proper to enforce a foreign arbitral award under the Convention when such an
award has been set aside by the Nigerian courts”).
84
Id. at 198.
85
Id. at 197.
86
Id.
87
Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
88
Id. at 872.
89
Id.
90
See The New York Convention art. (6), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
91
Spier, 663 F. Supp. at 875.
81
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order enforcing an award later condemned by the courts of that
foreign country.92
While some differences do exist between the rationales in Spier and Baker
Marine, in both instances the courts deferred to the national courts of the
forum where the arbitral award was issued. This reliance on the principle of
comity stands in stark contrast to the emphasis placed on the application of
American law by the D.C. District Court in Chromalloy. It is evident that
during the twenty years between the D.C. District Court’s decision in
Chromalloy and the 2013 decision by the Southern District of New York in
COMMISA v. PEP, the effect of Chromalloy was hardly felt as courts declined
to enforce awards that had been annulled or set aside at the seat of arbitration.93
C. Limited Enforcement Authority
In TermoRio, the D.C. Circuit slightly widened the enforceability of
annulled awards, dependent upon whether the award violated basic notions
of justice.94 Yet, the court never outlined what such a violation would entail.
The dispute in TermoRio arose after a breach of a contract between an energy
generator, TermoRio S.A. E.S.P., and a state-owned public utility
company.95 Here, the arbitral tribunal in Colombia found in favor of
TermoRio, but this award was later nullified by the highest Colombian
administrative court because the contract’s arbitration clause violated
Colombian law.96 TermoRio filed suit in the District Court against
Electranta and the Colombian government, seeking to have the original
award enforced.97 The court dismissed TermoRio’s claim because the
decision to nullify the award was made by a competent authority.98
The D.C. Circuit Court considered a similar rationale in TermoRio, as it
did in Chromalloy. There, the court analyzed the U.S. policy in favor of
arbitral dispute resolution, the rule of comity, and the enforcement
exceptions enumerated in the New York Convention.99 The court considered
public policy and acknowledged the importance of “limit[ing] the occasions
when a foreign judgment is ignored on [the] grounds of public policy.”100
92
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100

Id.
Hanson, supra note 79, at 849.
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 929.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id. at 938.
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Ultimately, the court decided that enforcing the award would “undermine a
principal precept of the New York Convention: an arbitration award does not
exist to be enforced in other Contracting States if it has been lawfully ‘set
aside’ by a competent authority in the State in which the award was
made.”101 The only exception to this is when “a foreign judgment is
unenforceable as against public policy to the extent that it is ‘repugnant to
fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the United States,’ ” yet the
court did not define what would constitute such an extreme violation of U.S.
public policy.102 The Second Circuit’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP finally
offered insight into public policy principles that justify the enforcement of an
annulled award.
IV. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO ENFORCEMENT
The Second Circuit’s enforcement approach broadened the scope of the
enforceability of arbitral awards within the United States. It aligned more
closely with European states that have enforced awards based on public
policy to accord with domestic or international policy. This enforcement
rationale is an equally protectionist response to the protectionist nature of the
Mexican government and other foreign states that have insulated their
government-owned industries from arbitration.
A. Ability to Annul Arbitral Awards
Many governments have found that they do not have the ability to annul
awards arbitrated in another state, yet they have created a “work-around” of
sorts to enforce awards annulled in other states, allowing them to insert their
policy preferences and protect parties against what they view as corruption or
illegitimate decisions. As previously discussed,
the New York Convention sets only the minimum conditions
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
and “does not deprive any interested party of any right he may
have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to
the extent allowed by the law or treaties of the country where
such award is sought to be relied upon.”103

101

Id. at 936.
Id. at 939 (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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HAMID G. GHARAVI, THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANNULMENT
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The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Rules, has adopted “[t]he principle of the exclusive
jurisdiction of courts at the place of arbitration to annul arbitral
awards. . . . ‘only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of [the]
State.’ ”104 A number of states have adopted this principle.105 Some states,
such as France have taken this principle further and will enforce awards
annulled outside their jurisdiction “in accordance with the views of the place
of enforcement.”106
While clearly the minority, a number of states have adopted this view,
allowing the enforcement of awards annulled in the arbitral forum in
accordance with the legal principles valued in the country of enforcement.107
The scope of enforcement and the rationales vary between countries, with
France arguably having the greatest latitude to enforce annulled awards.108
These enforcement theories allow states to advance both their domestic
judicial policies, as well as their policies regarding international legal values.
1. France: Broad Enforcement Authority
The French courts first adopted the practice of enforcing awards annulled at
the seat of arbitration without giving deference to international comity.109 The
French courts have faced this decision a number of times and have looked to

104

See id. at 12 (citing United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985: With Amendments as Adopted in
2006, art. 34(2)(1) (Vienna: United Nations, 2008).
105
See GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 13–14 for a complete list of the states that have adopted
this principle. The list includes states such as: Colombia, England, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Russia, and The Netherlands.
106
See Emmanuel Gaillard, The Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin,
14 ICSID REV. 16, 39 (1999). Legal scholars have argued that allowing the enforcement of
annulled awards discourages states from developing arbitration in its jurisdiction. Gaillard
argues that in enforcing an annulled award, a “state’s sovereignty over its territory is not in
question” because the enforcement concerns “the international effect of decisions concerning
arbitration rendered on a state’s territory,” and issues surrounding the enforcement of such
awards should be made “in accordance with views of the place of enforcement.” Id. Accord
GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 77–86.
107
See Bulletin: ICC Guide to National Procedures for Recognition and Enforcement of
Awards Under the New York Convention, 23 ICC ICARB. BULL., special supplement (2012),
for a general overview on countries’ responses to the question, “When, if ever, can a party
obtain recognition of foreign awards which have been set aside by the competent authority
referred to in Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention?”
108
See Gaillard, supra note 106, at 18; GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 86.
109
GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 86.
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“international public policy” as a reason to recognize annulled awards.110 In
Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., France’s cour de
cassation recognized an award that had been set aside in Austria after an
arbitral decision regarding a contractual dispute between Pabalk, a Turkish
company, and Norsolor, a French company.111 The cour de cassation held that
Article 7 of the New York Convention “[did] not deprive any interested party
of any right it may have to avail itself of an arbitral award in a manner and to
the extent allowed by the law where such award is sought to be relied upon.”112
Over the next three decades, the French courts refined the French view on the
enforcement of annulled awards.
In Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd., the
same court clarified their ability to enforce annulled decisions.113 The court
affirmed the lower court’s enforcement of an award annulled in the arbitral
forum in Switzerland on the basis that it was an international award, not tied
to the annulment in Switzerland, and it remained in existence even if “set
aside and its recognition in France [is] not contrary to international public
policy.”114 The Swiss courts had annulled the original award favoring
Hilmarton, yet the French court’s enforcement decision benefitted Omnium
de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A., a French company rather than
Hilmarton, a British company.115
In 2007, in Putrabali Adyamulia v. Rena Holding, France recognized an
award annulled in the arbitral forum in London.116 In 2001, after arbitration
proceedings surrounding a breach of contract between an Indonesian
company, Putrabali, and a French company, Rena Holding, the arbitral
tribunal found in favor of Rena Holding.117 Putrabali appealed to the High
Court of London, which annulled the original award and found in favor of
Putrabali.118 Rena Holding sought to have the original award enforced in
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Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.), http://newyorkconvention1
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Paris, where the court enforced the original award, in their favor.119 The
French court ultimately held that the arbitral award was enforceable because
“an international arbitral award, which is not anchored in any national legal
order, is a decision of international justice whose validity must be
ascertained with regard to the rules applicable in the country where its
recognition and enforcement are sought.”120
Most recently, in Maximov v. Novolipetsky Steel Mill (NLMK), the French
cour de cassation enforced an award that the arbitral forum in Russia had
previously annulled.121 Despite the differences in these holdings, the French
cour de cassation has repeatedly enforced annulled awards on the notion that
the awards are not tied to the policies of the arbitral forum, despite
contravening principles of international comity.122
2. The Netherlands: Narrow Enforcement Authority
Dutch courts have also asserted their ability to enforce awards annulled at
the seat of arbitration, albeit, with a much narrower approach. They have
exercised their discretion in enforcing awards on the basis of specific
evidence that the annulment was a result of unfair proceedings.123 In Yukos
Capital S.A.R.L. v. OAO Rosneft, the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam
enforced an award that had been set aside in Russia, the arbitral forum.124
The court reasoned that “it [was] in this way plausible that the judgments of
the Russian civil court in which the arbitrat[ion] awards were set aside the
result of a judicial process that must be qualified as partial and
dependent.”125 Despite its narrower approach, the Dutch court reached the
119
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Société OTV, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Mar. 23,1994, 9215.137 (Fr.); Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est
Epices, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] June 29, 2007, 05-18.053
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See Bulletin: ICC Guide to National Procedures for Recognition and Enforcement of
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same conclusion in Maximov v. NLMK.126 Here, the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal found that the Russian arbitration court’s annulment of the arbitration
award was “defective in respect of such essential issues that it no longer can
be said that [it] was a fair trial.”127 Based off of the Dutch decisions in
Maximov and Yukos, there is a heavy emphasis on the fairness of award
procedure in the arbitral forum, reflecting the importance of impartiality and
equality in arbitral proceedings.
3. No Enforcement Authority
Other states, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, take an opposite
approach. In Germany, courts defer to principles of international comity in
declining to enforce annulled awards.128 The Hungarian legislature’s
“Enforcement Act” lays out a step-by-step analysis for enforcing awards
rendered in other jurisdictions, leaving little discretionary authority for courts
to enforce awards annulled in the arbitral forum.129 In the United Kingdom,
there is a strong policy of respecting international comity by enforcing
awards, so long as they are not contrary to public policy in the arbitral
forum.130 English courts defer to other states, “even if English law would
have arrived at a different result on the ground that the underlying contract
breached public policy because its performance involved a breach of
statutory regulation in the place of performance.”131
B. The Paulsson—van den Berg Debate
Despite a plain language reading of the New York Convention, there is
heavily commentated disagreement about the enforceability of annulled
awards that centers around the role of the seat of the arbitration. For the
purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that arbitral seats have a right to set
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Hof Amsterdam 18 September 2012, 200.100.508/01 m.nt. (Maximov/NLMK) (Neth.).
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on Judicial Enforcement].
130
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aside awards, but nonetheless it is important to consider where this argument
falls within the debate.
Arbitration scholars, Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg infamously
debated the scope of the New York Convention regarding the enforcement of
annulled arbitration awards. Paulsson argued that all annulments do not have
to be given effect by the enforcing state.132 In his analysis of the New York
Convention, Paulsson explained that a “core objective” of the New York
Convention was “to free the international arbitral process from domination by
the law of the place of arbitration.”133 Paulsson advocated for enforcement
courts to “consider the grounds upon which awards are set aside, and exercise
their discretion to disregard” annulments based on local standards in the forum
state.134 Conversely, van den Berg posited that the “generally accepted rule”
regarding annulled awards under the New York Convention is that set aside
awards cannot be enforced elsewhere because “[the] concentration of judicial
control over the arbitral process [is] at the place of arbitration.”135 Van den
Berg explains that if an enforcing court concluded that it could not enforce the
annulled award under the New York Convention, it could look to its domestic
law, but even under its domestic law it is unlikely that there is such a basis to
enforce an annulled award.136
Regardless of the differences between the pro-enforcement and no
enforcement approaches taken by states and scholars, a state’s enforcement
stance reflects its judicial values. Paulsson and van den Berg are both
arguably correct in their views of the scope of enforcement of the New York
Convention. While a state’s enforcement decisions do not necessarily favor
entities in the place of enforcement, they do favor their state’s judicial values
and allow those values to be advanced in response to protectionist arbitral
decisions and laws in the arbitral forum.137
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Jan Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment
(LSA), 9 ICC ICARB. BULL. 14 (May 1998).
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V. ANALYZING THE PROTECTIONIST RATIONALE IN ENFORCING ANNULLED
AWARDS
While enforcing annulled awards allows states to protect their own
industries and subsidiaries against protectionist actions by other states, this
pro-enforcement ability also protects Western judicial policies and values.
The Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit followed the proenforcement interpretation by enforcing the award annulled by the Mexican
courts because doing so was necessary to “vindicate ‘fundamental notions of
what is decent and just’ in the United States.”138 This protectionist decision
is evidenced by the invocation of American jurisprudence policies in the
court’s discussion of whether to enforce an award regarding a contract that
specifically applied the laws of Mexico.139
The Second Circuit’s
constitutional analysis considered principles of judicial equity and ideas of
government taking.140 Ultimately, the Second Circuit declined to defer to the
Mexican decision and chose to protect its own “basic standards of justice in
the United States.”141 This court’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP falls
somewhere in between Paulsson and van den Berg’s take on the scope of the
New York Convention because the court used the New York Convention to
enforce the annulled award based on U.S. domestic legal principles.
A. Protectionism in COMMISA v. PEP
The Second Circuit first considered Mexico’s retroactive ban on
COMMISA’s claim against PEP because of the May 2009 passage of Section
98 of the Law of Public Works and Related Services. This section prevented
arbitration in situations regarding “administrative rescission [and] early
termination of the contracts.”142 The court outlined four provisions
“embedded” in the Constitution, which govern the retroactive application of
laws:
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The Ex Post Facto Clause’s ban on retroactive application
of penal legislation;

COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 111 (“[W]e do not think that the Southern District second-guessed the Eleventh
Collegiate Court, which appears only to have been implementing the law of Mexico. Rather,
the Southern District exercised discretion, as allowed by treaty, to assess whether the
nullification of the award offends basic standards of justice in the United States.”).
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The proscription against states retroactively impairing the
obligation of contracts;
The prohibition on Bills of Attainder, stopping legislatures
from ‘singling out disfavored persons and meting out
summary punishment for past conduct’; and
The Due Process Clause, and corresponding rights to ‘fair
notice.’ ”143

Based on these constitutional principles, as well as precedent, the court found
that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law,” particularly because of “the
unfairness associated with such application.”144 While the court declined to
refute the Mexican court’s statement that it was not retroactively applying
Section 98 according to Mexican law, the court found that the effect of the
award violated key constitutional principles and “resulted in a retroactive
application of Section 98 as a matter of United States law.”145 Moreover, the
court’s final assertion that “PEP is part of the government that promulgated
the law” explains the court’s view that this decision reflected government
expropriation without compensation and contradicts well-established
principles of American law.146
After analyzing Mexico’s annulment in light of the U.S. Constitution, the
Court considered judicial policy concerning litigants’ right to bring claims
and the applicable statute of limitations. The court identified numerous
precedential decisions affirming that “litigants with legal claims should have
an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”147 “Absent confirmation
of the award, COMMISA would lose the opportunity to bring its claims
because of the change in Mexican law subjecting COMMISA’s claims to the
forty-five-day statute of limitations in the Tax and Administrative Court.”148
Moreover, because the claims had been presented to the Mexican District
Court, they would be barred by res judicata, despite having never actually
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Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción,
962 F. Supp. 2d 642, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
145
Id. (“[I]t is incontestable that the capacity of PEP to arbitrate was established in prior
law; that it was withdrawn with respect to certain disputes that had already arisen; and that it
was withdrawn in a way that frustrated contractual expectation, undid an arbitral award, and
precluded redress by COMMISA in any forum.”).
146
Id. at 109.
147
Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); S. Pac. Terminal
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.
1309, 1317 (2012)).
148
Id. at 110.
144
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been heard.149
The court then addressed the “equitable concerns”
surrounding claim preclusion raised by the Mexican Court’s annulment—
COMMISA’s claims had been barred twice in Mexican court, in violation of
the basic U.S. principles of claim preclusion.150
Finally, the court considered “[g]overnment [e]xpropriation [w]ithout
[c]ompensation.”151 The court found that PEP, acting for the Mexican
government, rescinded the contract with COMMISA, and then the Mexican
legislature “frustrated relief that had been granted to COMMISA” before
barring its claim based on the statute of limitations and res judicata.152
Ultimately, this “amounted to a taking of private property without
compensation for the benefit of the government.”153 The court invoked U.S.
judicial policy by stating that this would be an unconstitutional taking in the
U.S. and a violation of NAFTA.154
Despite the application of U.S. judicial policy in interpreting the
enforceability of a Mexican contract annulled in Mexico, commentators have
concluded that the Southern District of New York and Second Circuit’s
decisions align with the pro-enforcement policy of other states, although the
U.S.’ rationale is different than the broad enforcement approach of France.155

149

Id.
Id. COMMISA’s failed amparo action prevented the arbitral panel from adjudicating the
claim, and later § 98 resulted in the Tax and Administrative Court rejecting COMMISA’s
claim based on res judicata. “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating [sic] issues that were or could have been
raised in the action.” Id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Yet, COMMISA
never had the opportunity to litigate its breach of contract claim against PEP because it was
twice subjected to changing laws which barred its claim.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. (citing NAFTA art. 1110, Jan. 1, 1994 “No party may . . . take a measure tantamount
to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (‘expropriation’), except . . . on
payment of compensation. . . .”).
155
Monique Sasson, The Question of U.S. Enforcement of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards,
AM. B. ASS’N (Feb. 6, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/adr/articles/wint
er2014-0214-question-of-us-enforcement.html (stating that “[i]n the Southern District’s view, the
Mexican judgment vacating the award was adopted in violation of basic notions of justice.
Under the Panama and New York Conventions, this should not be regarded as a strange
approach. Indeed, enforcement of awards set aside at the seat is viewed as appropriate in a
number of countries, such as France, even with no showing of a violation of basic notions of
justice, on the grounds that an annulled award is still alive outside the country that vacated it.”).
150
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B. Protectionism in Arbitration: Annulling Awards and Limiting Arbitration
The Second Circuit’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP was an effort to
protect the arbitration practice as a whole, while also upholding American
judicial values in light of a protectionist decision by another state.
The original agreement between COMMISA and PEP provided that:
[a]ny controversy, claim, difference, or dispute that may arise
from or that is related to, or associated with, the present
Contract or any instance of breach with the present Contract,
shall be definitively settled through arbitration conducted in
Mexico City, D.F., in accordance with the Conciliation and
Arbitration Regulations of the International Chamber of
Commerce that are in effect at that time.156
According to ICC Article 34(6), “Every award shall be binding on the
parties. By submitting the dispute to arbitration under the Rules, the parties
undertake to carry out any award without delay and shall be deemed to have
waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly
be made.”157 Under Article 29, awards can be annulled by an emergency
arbitrator.158 Yet, in the instance of COMMISA v. PEP, the arbitral award
was annulled by the Mexican courts after a retroactive application of a
modified law that prevented arbitration in contractual disputes concerning
government parties.159 Mexico’s passage of Section 98, which changed the
forum to adjudicate public contracts to the Tax and Administrative Court,
insulated the Mexican government from unfavorable arbitral decisions and
the uncertainty that could result from the flexible arbitral process by allowing
all decisions regarding public contracts to be adjudicated in the same court,
by the same pool of judges, and under the same applicable law.160
This protectionist method, employed by the Mexican government in
COMMISA v. PEP, parallels recent arbitral law changes made by the Russian
government.161 On September 1, 2016, Russia’s new international arbitration
156
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition and
in Support of Petitioner’s Motion to Confirm Arbitral Award at 4, Corporación Mexicana de
Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V., v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, No. 1:10cv-206 (AKH), 2010 WL 9512897 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
157
International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of the Court of Arbitration, art. 34 (2012).
158
Id. art. 29.
159
See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2016).
160
Id.
161
Public Works and Related Services Law, art. 98 (Mex.). Accord Federal’nyi Zakon RF
[Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the Russian Federation”], Federal
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laws went into effect.162 The laws includes a list of public law disputes that
are not subject to arbitration and must be adjudicated in a Russian court.163
This list includes: “[D]isputes arising out of a government or municipal
procurement of goods and services,” which could not be arbitrated prior to
the enactment of these laws and can still not be arbitrated, while
“administrative offences,” and “annulment of acts or decisions of public
authorities” can no longer be arbitrated.164
Like the Mexican government’s behavior regarding COMMISA and the
invocation of Section 98, Russia’s ban on arbitration regarding a number of
public contracts allows the Russian government to insulate itself from less
predictable outcomes.165 After decisions such as that which led to Yukos
Capital S.A.R.L. v. OAO Rosneft in the Netherlands, it is understandable why
the Russian government would seek to prevent such unfavorable outcomes
by limiting the situations in which awards could be rendered against a statecontrolled entity.166 While arbitration allows for flexibility, and in some
instances more favorable and predictable outcomes by the contracting parties
when unfavorable awards have been rendered against state entities, the
Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Amendments to Certain
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article 6(1)(3) of the Federal
Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law
on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015).
162
Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the
Russian Federation”], Federal Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF
[Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article
6(1)(3) of the Federal Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption
of the Federal Law on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec.
29, 2015).
163
Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the
Russian Federation”], Federal Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF
[Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article
6(1)(3) of the Federal Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption
of the Federal Law on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec.
29, 2015).
164
Id. Accord Steven P. Finizio & Dmitry Andreev, International Arbitration Alert: Russia
Implements Arbitration Reform, WILMER HALE (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wilmerhale.
com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PD
fs/2016-08-31-russia-implements-arbitration-reform.pdf.
165
Compare COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016), with Federal’nyi Zakon RF
[Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the Russian Federation”], Federal
Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Amendments to Certain
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article 6(1)(3) of the Federal
Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law
on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015).
166
See Hof Amsterdam 28 April 2009, 200.005.269/01 m.nt. (Yukos Capital S.A.R.L./OAO
Rosneft) (Neth.). An unofficial translation of this decision is available at: https://www.iiiglob
al.org/sites/default/files/media/Yukos_Capitla_SARC_V_OAO_Rosneft.PDF.
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state’s own judicial system appears to be a more appealing location to
adjudicate disputes. Yet, decisions that protect a state entity, over an
international—or even separate domestic entity—push other states to resort
to their own protectionist methods by seeking to protect either their own
judicial values, international legal standards, or the purpose of international
arbitration. As will be explained below, this is what the U.S., France, the
Netherlands and other pro-enforcement states have done in deciding to
enforce awards annulled in the arbitral forum.
C. Protecting Arbitration and Judicial Values
International arbitration furthers “the expeditious resolution of disputes
and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation.”167 International
arbitration allows the parties to decide on a dispute resolution process at the
time of contracting and allows for flexibility regarding time frames,
expenses, procedural decisions, confidentiality, arbitrator and expertise
decisions, and finality.168 While arbitral rules allow awards to be annulled in
the arbitral forum by the arbitral tribunal when particular conditions are
present, enforcing states have taken the opportunity to uphold these awards
to further domestic judicial principles and the core purposes of international
arbitration when the awards are annulled apart from the arbitral tribunal.169
This is what the Second Circuit did by affirming the Southern District’s
decision in COMMISA v. PEP and what the French courts have done
numerous times by enforcing annulled awards.
In COMMISA v. PEP, the Southern District of New York confirmed the
annulled award because the retroactive application of Section 98 would
effectively prevent COMMISA from having any recourse for the breach of a

167

See Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1998).
See Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 14. Accord W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s
Mission and the Application of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 243, 245 (2010) (“[I]nternational commercial arbitration has in the past been
considered to be a process that favors the application of the agreement of the parties, but also
stresses compromise and the application of equitable and commercial principles to alleviate
the strict application of law.”).
169
See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 906
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Société Rena Holding et Société
Moguntia Est Epices, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] June 29,
2007, 05-18.053 (Fr.); Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd. (1999),
2 All ER 146 (Comm.) 146 (Eng.); Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A.,
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.);
Hof Amsterdam 18 Sept. 2012, m.nt. (Maximov/NLMK) (Neth.); Hof Amsterdam 28 April
2009, 200.005.269/01 m.nt. (Yukos Capital S.A.R.L./OAO Rosneft) (Neth.).
168
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contract that it had substantially completed.170 The court considered four
judicial factors that are highly valued in both domestic judicial systems and the
larger international legal system.171 International comity is also highly valued
by both the U.S. courts and the international legal system.172 Yet, deferring to
international comity would negate the United States’ ability to consider the
importance of claims having an appropriate forum, or any forum at all, when
the international annulment contradicts key judicial principles, such as those
outlined by the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit in
COMMISA v. PEP. This decision allowed the U.S. court to protect its judicial
values in response to what was a protectionist effort in the arbitral forum.
France has used a similar protectionist approach by enforcing annulled
awards. In Putrabali, the French court ultimately held that the arbitral award
was enforceable because “an international arbitral award, which is not
anchored in any national legal order, is a decision of international justice
whose validity must be ascertained with regard to the rules applicable in the
country where its recognition and enforcement are sought.”173 Given the
court’s finding that the award should not have been annulled, rather than
deferring to international comity, it relied on appropriate enforcement
standards in France, thereby protecting French judicial policy.174 This is the
same approach France has taken in other pro-enforcement decisions.175
States’ decisions to protect their domestic judicial values and interpretations
of international judicial values protect the overall purposes of international
arbitration.

170

See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 107 (outlining four factors: “(1) the vindication of contractual undertakings and the
waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of retroactive legislation that disrupts
contractual expectations; (3) the need to ensure legal claims find a forum; and (4) the
prohibition against government expropriation without compensation”) (citing Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (explaining that “the presumption against retroactive
legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine older than our
Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly. . . .”)).
172
Id. at 100. The court explains that an appeals court must review a lower court’s decision
to not defer to international comity for abuse of discretion. This is a higher standard, under
which a district court decision will be upheld so long as it “falls within a broad range of
permissible conclusions.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990).
173
Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est
Epices, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] June 29, 2007, 0518.053 (Fr.).
174
Id.
175
See Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., available at Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.).
171
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D. Enforcing Annulled Awards: Upholding Pre-Contractual Expectations
and the Purposes of International Arbitration
Enforcing annulled awards allows courts to protect contractual
obligations in other forums. One of the Southern District of New York’s key
considerations in COMMISA v. PEP was “the repugnancy of retroactive
legislation that disrupts contractual expectations.”176 In contractual disputes,
the United States often defers to the expectations set out in the contract at the
time the contract was made.177 The court seeks to understand what the
parties reasonably anticipated, or could have reasonably anticipated, at the
time they made the contract.178 This method of seeking to uphold the parties’
expectations at the time of contracting and the considerations the parties
made in deciding on the terms of their contract allows disputes to be resolved
in a manner that upholds the value of the contractual process.179 This is
evidenced by the fact that only under certain situations, such as duress or
undue influence, are contractual breaches voidable; and, therefore, not
subject to stringent damages.180 Moreover, within the arbitration context,
U.S. courts often apply these same policies by generally deferring to the
terms outlined by the parties’ arbitration agreement in the original contract,
unless the agreement was procedurally or substantively unconscionable.181 A
strong preference is given to the parties’ expectations and desires at the time
they entered into the agreement.182
176

COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 2016).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) AM. LAW INST. (1981) (stating
that “a party bears the risk of a mistake when (b) he is aware, at the time the contract [was]
made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake
relates. . . .” (emphasis added)); U.C.C. § 2-715 (stating that “[c]onsequential damages
resulting from the seller’s breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise” (emphasis added)); Hadley v.
Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 LR Exch. 341 (holding that the breaching party is
responsible for damages that were reasonably foreseeable “at the time they made the
contract . . .” (emphasis added)).
178
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b); U.C.C. § 2-715; Hadley
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
179
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b); U.C.C. § 2-715; Hadley
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
180
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 AM. LAW INST. (1981)
(explaining that a manifestation of assent induced by undue influence makes a contract
voidable); Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966) (holding that undue
influence from over-persuasion can make a contract voidable).
181
See, e.g., In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8,
2000).
182
See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding
that an arbitral award should be enforced based on the language of the parties’ agreement).
177
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At the time COMMISA and PEP contracted to build the oil platform, both
parties made contractual decisions with the intent to resolve any disputes in
arbitration, should they arise.183 By allowing parties to determine the
specific rules governing their contracts, arbitration agreements allow parties
to negate the risks involved with entering into high-cost contracts in foreign
areas, particularly when foreign governments are involved.184 This is the
case with COMMISA and PEP.185 Given that arbitration allows the parties
to select the procedural and substantive law that will be applied to adjudicate
their dispute and to select their arbitrators, parties are able to ensure that they
will not be subject to changing laws or policies that can unfairly prejudice an
international party.186 Ultimately, the agreement to arbitrate any dispute
allowed COMMISA to negate, or at least minimize, the risks involved in
such high-value international contracts.
In contract disputes, U.S. courts look to the contract to see if either party
has allocated the risk.187 Resorting to arbitration is a way for parties to
specifically ensure that they have not allocated to themselves the risk of
changing policies, norms, or laws when they are carrying out a contract in a
foreign state.188 Moreover, arbitration allows parties to separate their claims
from their own states or the location of the dispute by allowing parties to
determine procedural and substantive rules.189 COMMISA’s right to
arbitrate any dispute that arose out of its contract with PEP was a way to
ensure that the risk was not allocated to COMMISA and that it would be
protected from any unforeseen changes that would affect its rights in the
Mexican judicial system.

183

COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2016).
See id.
185
See Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 14.
186
Id.
187
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a) AM. LAW INST. (1981) (stating
that “[a] party bears the risk of a mistake when (a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of
the parties. . . ” (emphasis added)); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 67 (W.D. Penn. 1980) (stating that in particular situations “the court must allocate the risk
in some reasoned way” (emphasis added)).
188
See BORN, supra note 16, at 71 (explaining that “[p]recisely because national legal
systems differ profoundly, parties inevitably seek to ensure that, if international disputes arise,
those disputes are resolved in the forum that is most favorable to their interests”).
189
Id. at 73–74 (explaining that “[o]ne of the central objectives of international arbitration
agreements is to provide a neutral forum for dispute resolution, detached from either the
parties or their respective home state governments”).
184
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E. Upholding the Parties’ Informed Expectations
U.S. courts generally defer to arbitration when parties explicitly allow for
this in their original contract. Similar to the flexibility arbitration affords
parties, allowing parties to determine at the time of contracting that any
disputes that may arise will be adjudicated by arbitration permits the parties
to have informed expectations about what laws will govern their contract.
This is particularly important when multiple jurisdictions are concerned with
fulfilling expectations outlined in a contract.
At the time COMMISA and PEP entered into their original contract, they
explicitly stated that all disputes would be adjudicated through arbitration.
Consequently, when COMMISA sought arbitration to resolve this
contractual breach between the parties, COMMISA believed this arbitral
award would be final unless there was a reason to set it aside under the
Panama Convention.190 Here, that was not the case. Mexico changed its law
regarding government procurement contracts and retroactively applied this
law to the original contract between COMMISA and PEP.191 The retroactive
application of laws negated the informed expectations the parties had at the
time they entered into the contract.192 While the retroactive application of
laws can occur with administrative laws, there is a strong preference against
the retroactive application of laws in the United States.193 Retroactively
applying Mexico’s ban on arbitration involving government procurement
contracts not only prevented COMMISA from having its claim arbitrated,
but it also prevented COMMISA from having any recourse for its breach of
contract. This total ban on a forum in which COMMISA could have its
claim heard violated not only COMMISA’s expectation that it would have an
arbitral forum in which its dispute could be heard, but also its expectation
that there would be a forum in which to hear its dispute. This violates a core
principle of the U.S. legal system—one’s right to have their dispute heard in
a court of law.194
190

See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 99.
192
See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (explaining that retroactively
enforced statutes raise concerns about the Legislature’s power “to sweep away settled
expectations suddenly,” and as “a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals”).
193
See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988) (explaining
that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law. . . . Even where some substantial justification for
retroactive rulemaking is presented, courts should be reluctant to find such authority absent an
express statutory grant.”).
194
See COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 109 (explaining that “litigants with legal claims should have an
opportunity to bring those claims somewhere” (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
254 n.22 (1981); S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012))).
191
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F. Protecting International Comity
Finally, despite being an international rather than a domestic principle,
international comity is a core tenant of U.S. courts’ decisions regarding
private international law.195 The United States has a strong preference of
deferring to international comity to determine whether to enforce awards
annulled in their arbitral forum.196 This principle is explained in many
arbitration enforcement decisions and in other cases of international
litigation. In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the executive branch, rather than judges, has the
responsibility to recognize the consequences of other states implementing
legislation that is “contrary to essential principles of justice and morality.”197
However, the Supreme Court has explained that there are certain situations in
which deference to international comity would not be proper.198 Such was
the case in Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California.199 Here, the
Supreme Court decided that while the lower court had the discretion to defer
to international comity and refuse to consider the substance of the claim, it
was improper to defer to international comity in such a significant antitrust
case.200 Another instance is when doing so would be “repugnant to
fundamental notions of what is decent and just”—this was the case in
COMMISA v. PEP.201
In COMMISA v. PEP, the Southern District of New York and the Second
Circuit undoubtedly had the authority to enforce the annulled arbitration award
under the New York and Panama Conventions. Yet, the United States looked
to international comity before deciding to enforce the annulled award. The
195

See Paul, supra note 18, at 19–38.
See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907
(D.D.C. 1996) (finding that international comity was a policy to be considered, but that the
United States court was not required to give it deference when it was a factor under the act of
state doctrine, which had to be limited in this case); TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.,
487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (deferring to international comity under the New York
Convention); Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999)
(affirming the lower court’s finding that “it would not be proper to enforce a foreign arbitral
award under the [New York] Convention when such an award has been set aside by the
Nigerian courts”).
197
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972).
198
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
199
Id.
200
Id. at 798 (“[I]nternational comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in
the circumstances alleged here.”). In its analysis, the lower court applied the tri-partite
“Timberlane” test. The third prong of this analysis considers “the appropriateness of
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in light of considerations of international comity and
fairness.” Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984)).
201
COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 2016).
196
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Second Circuit reviewed the Southern District of New York’s decision to deny
international comity to Mexico’s award for an abuse of discretion.202
Ultimately, despite the “prudential concern of international comity,” the
Second Circuit concluded that deferring to international comity in this
situation would offend U.S. public policy.203 The circumstances surrounding
COMMISA v. PEP were similar to those outlined in Hartford Fire Insurance
Company v. California, as it was decided that the court could not blindly defer
to international comity because doing so would violate U.S. public policy by
choosing an outcome that favored the retroactive application of laws.204
G. Possible Enforcement Scenarios in the United States
The situation in COMMISA v. PEP posed a unique set of circumstances
for the Southern District of New York and then the Second Circuit to grapple
with in determining whether to enforce the award that the Mexican court
later annulled. The parties explicitly contracted for arbitration to resolve any
dispute that may arise during the course of the relationship.205 This
arbitration provision was intended to ensure the speedy, fair, and flexible
adjudication of disputes, should they arise.206 The United States has a strong
principle in favor of arbitration when parties have particularly contracted for
arbitration.207 Despite the reasons the parties have for choosing to arbitrate
their disputes rather than take them to a court, it is possible, but unlikely, that
considering the principle of international comity, the Southern District of
New York would not have enforced the annulled award even if COMMISA
had the opportunity to have its claim heard in any legal forum in Mexico.
In COMMISA v. PEP, the Mexican legislature changed the applicable
statute of limitations for government procurement disputes from ten years to
forty-five days.208 This action completely barred COMMISA from initiating
a law suit because more than forty-five days had passed before COMMISA
brought its claim to the Tax and Administrative Court.209 Even if
COMMISA had been able to litigate its claim in court, it is still unlikely that
202

Id. at 100 (citing Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir.
1999)).
203
Id. at 106 (citing Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850,
854 (2d Cir. 1997); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1986)).
204
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); COMMISA v. PEP, 832
F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016).
205
COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 98.
206
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the Second Circuit would have upheld this decision. Arbitration allows
parties to select a forum that will limit national bias and foster impartial
decisions.210 Impartiality is not guaranteed when local courts are left to
adjudicate a dispute between a local party and a foreign party.211 Even
considering principles of international comity, upholding the decision of the
Mexican court to set aside COMMISA’s award would have undermined the
United States’ policy of deferring to the parties’ expectations at the time of
contracting because the parties explicitly contracted for arbitration to resolve
any dispute that might arise.212
While COMMISA v. PEP was in many ways viewed as a revolutionary
decision by the Second Circuit, it is not likely to lead to an influx of
enforcement cases for U.S. courts to adjudicate. Only in certain, rare
circumstances, such as the one outlined in COMMISA v. PEP, will U.S.
courts be likely to enforce an annulled award because enforcing such an
award violates international comity. Regardless, by choosing to enforce or
not to enforce an award annulled by the protectionist decision of another
state, the United States is protecting core principles of contract law, one’s
right to have their claim heard, the purposes of international arbitration, and
international comity.
VI. CONCLUSION
While in COMMISA v. PEP the United States appears to have adopted the
same broad enforcement authority as the French courts have adopted, the
Second Circuit’s affirmation of the Southern District of New York’s award
closely follows the narrow enforcement authority adopted in Chromalloy
some twenty years prior. The United States sits squarely in the middle of the
enforcement spectrum by adopting this narrow-enforcement authority
approach, and this is the best place for U.S. courts to remain. By exercising
a narrow-enforcement authority, U.S. courts can protect U.S. judicial values,
while also protecting core international judicial principles, such as
international comity—another value of the U.S. legal system.
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